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Unicode Inspector & Hidden Character Sanitizer

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Security and debugging microscope for source code, AI-generated copy, and suspicious domains. Reveals every Unicode code point (`U+XXXX`), flags Zero-Width Space (`U+200B`), BOM (`U+FEFF`), and CVE-2021-42574 BiDi override attacks, and strips or normalizes (`NFC`/`NFD`/`NFKC`) them in one click.

100% In-Browser No Server Storage Instant Results
Invisible / ZWSP1
BiDi Overrides1
Combining Marks2
UTF-16 / UTF-8 Bytes45 / 53 B
NFC Normalized?No (NFD/Mixed)
Trojan Source / BiDi Control Detected: Found 1 directional override character(s). These can visually reorder source code tokens cleanly hidden during code review.
#CharCode PointUTF-8 HexCategoryDescription
0TU+005454ASCIIASCII (T)
1iU+006969ASCIIASCII (i)
2êU+00EAC3 AAUnicodeUnicode Character
3́U+0301CC 81Combining MarkCombining Diacritical Mark
4nU+006E6EASCIIASCII (n)
5gU+006767ASCIIASCII (g)
6 U+002020WhitespaceSPACE
7VU+005656ASCIIASCII (V)
8iU+006969ASCIIASCII (i)
9eU+006565ASCIIASCII (e)
10̣U+0323CC A3Combining MarkCombining Diacritical Mark
11tU+007474ASCIIASCII (t)
12 U+002020WhitespaceSPACE
13NU+004E4EASCIIASCII (N)
14FU+004646ASCIIASCII (F)
15DU+004444ASCIIASCII (D)
16·U+200BE2 80 8BInvisible / FormatZERO WIDTH SPACE (ZWSP)
17 U+002020WhitespaceSPACE
18+U+002B2BASCIIASCII (+)
19 U+002020WhitespaceSPACE
20hU+006868ASCIIASCII (h)
21iU+006969ASCIIASCII (i)
22dU+006464ASCIIASCII (d)
23dU+006464ASCIIASCII (d)
24eU+006565ASCIIASCII (e)
25nU+006E6EASCIIASCII (n)
26 U+002020WhitespaceSPACE
27ZU+005A5AASCIIASCII (Z)
28WU+005757ASCIIASCII (W)
29SU+005353ASCIIASCII (S)
30PU+005050ASCIIASCII (P)
31 U+00A0C2 A0WhitespaceNO-BREAK SPACE (NBSP)
32aU+006161ASCIIASCII (a)
33nU+006E6EASCIIASCII (n)
34dU+006464ASCIIASCII (d)
35 U+002020WhitespaceSPACE
36BU+004242ASCIIASCII (B)
37iU+006969ASCIIASCII (i)
38DU+004444ASCIIASCII (D)
39iU+006969ASCIIASCII (i)
40·U+202EE2 80 AEBiDi ControlRIGHT-TO-LEFT OVERRIDE (RLO — Trojan Source risk)
41tU+007474ASCIIASCII (t)
42eU+006565ASCIIASCII (e)
43sU+007373ASCIIASCII (s)
44tU+007474ASCIIASCII (t)

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How It Works Under the Hood

The inspector iterates over Unicode scalar code points cleanly using `for (const ch of input)` (keeping emoji surrogate pairs intact) rather than naive `.split("")`, encodes UTF-8 byte sequences with `TextEncoder`, and classifies dangerous format controls: Zero-Width characters (`U+200B`–`U+200D`, `U+2060`, `U+FEFF`), Bidirectional overrides (`U+202A`–`U+202E`, `U+2066`–`U+2069`), and non-ASCII space variants (`U+00A0` NBSP).

Step-by-Step Instructions

1

Paste suspicious source code, a domain name, markdown copy, or error-causing config string.

2

Inspect the Diagnostic Alert banner highlighting any hidden Zero-Width chars, BiDi Trojan Source controls, or Non-Breaking Spaces (`U+00A0`).

3

Browse the per-code-point breakdown table showing glyph badge, `U+XXXX`, decimal scalar, UTF-8 hex bytes, and hazard classification.

4

Click Strip Invisible Controls, Replace Special Spaces with ASCII Space, or Normalize (`NFC`, `NFD`, `NFKC`, `NFKD`) and copy the clean string.

Key Features & Performance

  • Detects CVE-2021-42574 Trojan Source BiDi override characters (`RLO`, `LRO`, `PDI`, etc.)
  • Flags invisible `U+200B` ZWSP, `U+200C`/`U+200D` joiners, `U+FEFF` BOM, and `U+00A0` NBSPs that silently break parsers/URLs
  • Proper astral-plane handling for 4-byte UTF-8 emojis (never splits surrogate pairs)
  • One-click `NFC` / `NFD` / `NFKC` / `NFKD` normalization and control stripping
  • 100% browser-only execution safe for security incident strings

Methodology, Formulas & Technical Standards

Characters are split via Unicode code point iteration (`Array.from(text)`), while UTF-8 byte lengths derive from `new TextEncoder().encode(ch)`. Normalization invokes built-in ECMAScript UAX #15 (`String.prototype.normalize`). Note that legitimate ZWJ (`U+200D`) inside compound emojis (e.g., family emojis) is flagged visibly so you choose whether to strip controls.

Common Real-World Use Cases

  • Finding why two visually identical YAML keys, JSON keys, or Python identifiers fail equality checks (`U+200B` or mixed NFC vs NFD Vietnamese accents)
  • Auditing untrusted code snippets for hidden Trojan Source directional override spoofing before merging
  • Cleaning copy-pasted ChatGPT/Word text full of `U+00A0` non-breaking spaces or stray `U+200B` watermarks
  • Verifying exact UTF-8 byte representation of characters for protocol debugging

Worked Examples & Edge Cases

Hidden Zero-Width Space in Variable Name

Input
api​Key = "123"
Output
Flagged U+200B (ZERO WIDTH SPACE) at index 3 -> Sanitized: apiKey = "123"

Visually looks like `apiKey` in most fonts but causes `ReferenceError` or auth header mismatches.

Vietnamese NFD vs NFC Normalization

Input
tiếng (decomposed e + combining acute + circumflex = 7 chars)
Output
NFC -> tiếng (composed = 5 chars, identical visually)

macOS HFS+/APFS filenames often use NFD while Linux/Windows/Web use NFC.

Limitations, Scope & Accuracy Notes

  • • Stripping all `U+200D` (Zero Width Joiner) will split multi-person compound ZWJ emojis into individual base emojis.
  • • Cross-script visual homoglyphs (e.g., Cyrillic `а` vs Latin `a`) are distinguishable by viewing their `U+XXXX` hex scalar (`U+0430` vs `U+0061`) rather than stripped automatically so legitimate Cyrillic/Greek text is never mangled.

Local Browser Processing & Privacy

Traditional web converters upload your documents, snippets, or media files to remote servers. Unicode Inspector & Hidden Character Sanitizer runs inside your browser tab:

Processed in This Tab

Your input text and files are processed locally without uploading payloads to a processing server.

No Tool Payload Logging

Microdeck does not log or store the files or inputs you paste into tool workspaces (normal static hosting/CDN requests still load page assets).

Tab Memory Lifecycle

Working outputs stay in your browser tab and are released when you reset the tool or close the tab.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is a Trojan Source BiDi attack?

Tracked as CVE-2021-42574, attackers embed invisible Bidirectional override characters (`U+202E`, `U+2066`, etc.) inside comments or strings so human reviewers see different logic order than the compiler executes.

When should I choose NFC vs NFKC normalization?

Use `NFC` for standard text and Vietnamese/European accents. Use `NFKC` when you also want compatibility characters (like fullwidth ASCII `A`, superscript `²`, or ligatures `fi`) collapsed to plain ASCII equivalents.

Why does macOS sometimes show different Unicode lengths than Linux for the same word?

macOS filesystem paths frequently store accented letters in decomposed `NFD` form (base letter + combining mark), whereas web forms and Linux generally emit `NFC` precomposed characters.

Does the inspector alter emojis cleanly?

Yes, code-point iteration reads full 21-bit scalars (`U+1F680` etc.) instead of splitting UTF-16 surrogates into broken halves.

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